Defining Knowledge

Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, can be an interesting and relevant subject. Whilst it is difficult to define so that the definition meets with general agreement, we are also learning more about it through scientific advances. Or maybe it is knowledge itself that is difficult to define, rather than epistemology.

The meaning of knowledge has come under considerable stress in recent years as the word has been used in connection with business assets, profit and growth. The stress seems to be related to the fact that people have respect for knowledge, more respect than for data etc. This seems to have compelled some people to try to associate as many things as possible with knowledge so that these things are seen in a higher regard than they might otherwise be seen.

Sometimes excellent business systems that deal very effectively with information are labelled under a knowledge banner. It seems sad that people are trying to misrepresent things or systems that are actually very useful in their own right as information systems.

In order to qualify these claims it is necessary to understand what knowledge is so that things that are, and are not knowledge can be recognised.

Clearly, and it really should be clear, knowledge is about knowing. As far as we (the human race) know, it is people that know things, certainly not books or documents, but who can say about some other animals. But it is not quite as simple as that, knowledge is about truth. If I say that I know that the capital city of France is Sydney; that is not knowledge because it is wrong. Having knowledge related to truth is a good thing rather than a bad thing. It is also a factor that separates knowledge from information. Of course there is a great deal of information that is true or correct but it is perfectly acceptable for information to be wrong or incorrect.

Truth is not the only thing that defines knowledge. As I have already said, knowledge needs to be known by a person. The text that you are reading is in itself, not knowledge, even if you agree with it and even if it is true. But you can turn it into knowledge, knowledge that you possess. You will need to establish its truth and you will probably have good reasons for accepting that it is true and therefore believing it. One of the fundamentals of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is that knowledge is: justified true belief. Just for the record, it is clear that books don’t believe things.

So if I said that the capital city of France is Paris, but in fact, I was convinced that it is Sydney and was simply lying to you, as I see it, then this is not knowledge either, even though it is correct. This is a little more difficult to accept than the truth argument. It relates to something that I think that I know, i.e. that the capital city of France is Sydney, but I am wrong. However, I decide to lie to you and by chance happen to tell you that the capital city of France is Paris. The knowledge in question is the knowledge that I possess, but I am wrong and have only told you the truth by chance. It does not seem reasonable to claim that I possess that item of knowledge, simply because I don’t.

So, not only does the knowledge have to be true and possessed by a person, that person must also believe that the knowledge is true, otherwise it would be a bit of a mockery to claim that the person that does not believe the so called knowledge, actually possesses it.

As far as the previous epistemological definition for knowledge goes, there is one more condition to be satisfied before something can be said to be knowledge. This condition is justification. Continuing with my previous claim that the capital city of France is Sydney and reflecting on my decision to lie to you and tell you that it is actually Paris; I have now decided to change my mind and convince myself that the capital city of France is Paris. I have simply decided, after one or two glasses of wine, to change my mind. I have absolutely no proof, reason, or justification for changing my mind in this way, I have simply decided to do it.

I have now, by chance, got it right and furthermore, if I now tell you that the capital city of France is Paris, I am now correct, it is the truth, and because of my completely irrational change of mind, I now believe it. After knowing all of this, there would be few who would claim that I was knowledgeable in this respect and few would claim that I ‘really’ knew that the capital city of France is Paris. It is still not knowledge because I am not justified in my belief.

Even though this description revolves around a simple fact, it nevertheless makes the point about why epistemology contains the claim that knowledge is justified true belief.

As clear as all this sounds, to me at least, there are challenges to the meaning associated with justification, belief and very many challenges to truth. Simon Blackburn’s book called ‘Truth’ is, I think, an excellent exploration of the concept. I hold what I believe to be a relatively simple view of truth; that it is what actually happens or exists in our common environment. I don’t believe that a more detailed exploration of this is practical or even called for, other than to say that our common environment is the physical world that we all live in together.

Justification and belief are associated with the common environment but they also relate to the internal thoughts of a person and how that person interprets the environment through his or her senses, personal experiences and memories.

A definition of knowledge therefore, must acknowledge the way that a person actually knows something. This is one area where scientific advances are changing human the understanding of knowledge and what it means to know.

What seems clear is that some particular element of a person’s knowledge is represented by activity in the brain. More specifically, the firing of a group of neurons, or brain cells, together. This network of cells that fire or are active together during the recall or use of a particular piece of knowledge, are likely to be distributed across the brain structure rather than all being located in one place within the brain. I will not go into this further here but it is an interesting subject to follow.

Since your brain and my brain are probably different in the precise location and connectivity of brain cells, it is unlikely that when we both possess exactly the same piece of knowledge, that this is represented in exactly the same way in our two brains. We may both produce the same response from a common stimulus, for instance, we may both answer ‘Paris’ to the audible question ‘what is the capital city of France?’, but the way our two brains produce this response may be, or rather, is likely to be, different. There are implications that result from this situation.

When we access the knowledge in our brains, there is always a translation that takes place. I translate a specific representation into the word ‘Paris’ and you translate a different internal representation into the word ‘Paris’. So it appears that we both have exactly the same knowledge, but maybe we don’t. This can be discussed further under a heading of knowledge transfer.

What the previous discussion does show is that whilst you and I may appear to have the same knowledge, at the same time, the knowledge that we hold separately is very much our own personal knowledge. The book, Personal Knowledge, by Michael Polonyi, is not up to date as far as neurophysiology is concerned and can be a bit challenging to read but it is worth the effort.